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ABSTRACT During and after a disaster, the perceived quality of communication networks often becomes
remarkably degraded with an increased ratio of packet losses due to physical damages of the networking
equipment, disturbance to the radio frequency signals, continuous reconfiguration of the routing tables,
or sudden spikes of the network traffic, e.g., caused by the increased user activity in a post-disaster period.
Several techniques have been introduced so far (mainly using data retransmission mechanisms) to tolerate
such circumstances. Among them, gossiping has been shown to be efficient in the recovery from message
losses. However, a conventional gossiping scheme may exhibit security problems, which can be exploited
for further attacks (such as Denial of Service – DoS attack). For instance, the flooding method used by the
gossiping can be used to forward the traffic towards many vulnerable nodes to drain their resources and
compromise them. Typically, protection against DoS attacks is realized by using cryptographic primitives.
However, their scalability limits and costs make them improper for emergency communications after a
disaster. In this article, we introduce an approach based on reinforcement learning and game theory to
protect the gossiping scheme from DoS attacks without incurring the costs of cryptographic primitives.
In our method, nodes properly select which requests to satisfy, which in turn helps other nodes to avoid
receiving manipulated gossip messages from malicious and colluded nodes. Additionally, our method
operates without exploiting any cryptographic primitives, which prevents excessive energy waste that is
undesired in post-disaster resilient networking. Simulation experiments performed in OMNeT++ confirmed
the advantages of our approach over the reference schemes in terms of reliability, security, overhead, latency,
and power efficiency.
INDEX TERMS Communication system security, disaster-resilience, gossiping algorithm, game theory,
reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasive accessibility to the Internet and the availability
of cheap and small computing devices are making infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) predominant
in our daily life. We have been already living in a digital
society thanks to novel concepts such as the Internet of
Things, smart cities, or Industry 4.0 [1]. Digital technologies
have revolutionized communications among humans, insti-
tutional relationships, and the way our society operates. All
the main actors from individuals or groups to companies and
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Baoping Cai .
institutions strongly rely on computer networks to support
their aims or businesses. Typically, the Internet can offer ser-
vices at a sufficient quality of service (QoS) level. However,
numerous massive failure scenarios, often called disasters,
may compromise the performance of the network to the point
that it becomes unavailable or offers services of a remarkably
degraded quality [2], [3]. Following [4], disaster events in
communication networks can be broadly classified into three
categories, namely natural disasters, malicious attacks, and
technology-related disasters, shown in Fig. 1.
In particular, natural disasters refer to the adverse effects
of the forces of nature. They include predictable events
such as floods, fires, volcano eruptions, or hurricanes [4]
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FIGURE 1. Disaster events affecting communication networks based
on [4].
(e.g., hurricane Katrina in 2005 in the US responsible for
long-lasting massive failures of network nodes due to power
outages for over ten days, on average [5], [6]). Unpre-
dictable disasters, in turn, comprise earthquakes for which
the precise location and time cannot be foreseen despite the
availability of statistical data on past disasters. For exam-
ple, the 2011 Greatest Japan Earthquake of 9.0 magnitude
resulted in failures of multiple undersea optical links and
about 1500 telecom switching offices [7], [8]. As natural
disasters commonly occur at specific locations, they lead to
the so-called regional failures of multiple network elements
located in a given area [8]–[11], as shown in Fig. 2.
Malicious attacks are human activities affecting commu-
nication networks either directly (see, e.g., electromagnetic
pulse attack (EMP), and denial of service (DoS) attack [3],
[4]), or indirectly (such as bombing or use of weapons ofmass
destruction (WMD)). Their impact on network performance
may be severe, and their risk is rising [12]. Contrary to
natural disasters, failures of network elements following from
technology-related disasters and malicious attacks, instead of
being confined in a specific region, are commonly spread
across the network. In particular, the location of nodes failed
due to software issues can be often considered as random.
Also, attackers are mainly interested in compromising the
network elements not necessarily located only in a given
region but playing a significant role in the entire network
(such as links of high capacity/nodes switching a large
amount of data or acting as information servers).
Massive failures in communication networks can also be
a result of technology-related disasters due to internal issues
such as software errors and hardware faults at multiple loca-
tions [13]. External events of power supply faults can, in turn,
lead to cascading failures in interdependent networks [14].
For instance, in the scenario of inter-dependence between
a power grid and a communication network, a failure of even
a single node in one system (e.g., a power grid providing
power supply to a communication network) may switch off
many nodes in a communication network. If this communi-
cation network provides the control functions to the power
grid, failures are likely to be propagated back to the power
grid, implying even a total collapse of both systems.
Severe disasters can also cause temporary unavailability
of links when the damage is not physical and can be auto-
matically recovered through the reconfiguration of routers,
FIGURE 2. Example failure region characteristic to natural disasters.
as shown in [15], possibly through software-based mecha-
nisms and network reconfiguration [13]. Permanent failures
are much more challenging to handle, as component substi-
tution is required to revert the full link availability. More-
over, a disaster can, temporarily or permanently, damage also
data centres hosting the core services or cloud services. As
disasters often affect people, communication networks are
viewed as an essential part of the critical infrastructure [16]
allowing us to communicate and providing emergency com-
munications between citizens and authorities. Therefore, in a
post-disaster period, we can often observe a substantial
increase in the network traffic demand volume, which is hard
to serve in a network already affected by a disaster event and
contributes to network saturation and service unavailability.
In a disaster scenario, communication availability is also
essential for rescue team members to coordinate their activi-
ties and for people in the affected areas to receive the rescue
information. However, it may not be feasible in a network
not enhanced with disaster-resilience features [17]. As a
concrete example, in a wildfire in Portugal in June 2017,
a large number of users were cut off from using fixed-line and
cellular communication services [18]. It led to remarkable
traffic congestion in the isolated areas of the network, as well
as affected the emergency communications among rescue
teams, which, in turn, caused a large number of casualties.
These results have shown that an efficient and reliable noti-
fication mechanism is also necessary to build collaborative
crisis management or emergency networks by local authori-
ties and dedicated civil protection organizations [19]. Since
disasters are increasing in frequency and scale, and their
impact on communication networks is non-negligible [20],
it is crucial to design novel mechanisms to sustain the system
availability to operate in a post-disaster period. In particular,
it is of utmost importance to assure reliable delivery of mes-
sages in emergency scenarios despite the possible occurrence
of malicious activities in a communication network already
affected by a disaster.
As disasters often affect communication networks, dissem-
ination of messages in a post-disaster period can be provided
by setting up the alternative communication paths either
proactively (i.e., before the disaster occurrence) or in a reac-
tive manner by re-configuring the network after a disaster.
In particular, as discussed in this article, a scheme called
gossiping (a distributed scheme of message dissemination
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where multiple copies of information are forwarded towards
the destination via multiple paths) is considered as a proper
solution in many disaster scenarios for message dissemina-
tion. However, as gossiping exhibits vulnerabilities which
can be exploited in further attacks (or to compromise the
end-user applications built on top of gossiping), and since the
presence of malicious nodes in a post-disaster period is not a
rare event [35], [36], a proper functioning of gossiping still
requires certain adjustments.
A. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
In this article, we focus on the application of the gossiping
scheme for reliable communications in a post-disaster period
(i.e., when multiple elements of the network become severely
affected by a disaster). A particular interest in this article is to
protect gossiping against DoS attacks in the network already
affected by a disaster. In this context, the achievements of this
article are threefold and include:
(1) The proposal of the gossiping scheme providing protec-
tion against DoS attacks without using any digital sig-
natures to guarantee authorship and message integrity.
Our solution leverages on game theory to countermea-
sure DoS attacks by modelling the node and request
selection at each gossiping round as a non-cooperative
game, where strategy and payoff mapping is imple-
mented by means of reinforcement learning and myopic
best response dynamics are used to converge towards
an optimum. The novelty is in adapting a solution for
congestion-control in gossiping to provide protection
against DoS attacks without the need of using the cryp-
tographic primitives with too high costs for emergency
networks. The formulated utility function and reinforce-
ment learning allows distinguishing between the traf-
fic caused by the execution of DoS attacks and traffic
from legitimate users sending urgent messages simulta-
neously, thanks to the feedback on the utility of received
gossip messages.
(2) The usability of the proposed solution in post-disaster
periods following the occurrence of all major scenarios
of disasters. Indeed, as our gossiping scheme does not
depend on any centralized authority needed for identi-
fication, trust, and certificate management (but makes
decisions in a distributed manner in a non-cooperative
game), it fits well the post-disaster communications
often being data-centric with anonymous data transmis-
sions.
(3) The performance assessment of our gossiping scheme
providing a broad set of scenarios related to different
sizes of disasters and scopes of DoS attacks to confirm
its high reliability, security, scalability, and efficiency,
as well as low overhead, compared to the conventional
gossiping scheme.
An essential advantage of our approach is its simplicity
in terms of implementation and compatibility with other
components either at the network, or at the application level.
Our secure gossiping scheme can be widely used to provide
FIGURE 3. Classification of information delivery schemes in a
post-disaster scenario.
recovery of messages in a post-disaster period for appli-
cations using both the publish-and-subscribe strategy (e.g.,
for communications between authorities and end-users) and
for direct communications among users. The condition for
a correct malicious nodes detection is that a DoS attack
is conducted only by forging valid identifies to issue more
requests than needed on behalf of legitimate nodes. We have
left as a future work the protection against more complex
attacks where the message content (both to request retrans-
mission and express the gossip utility feedback) can be
altered. In these cases, the cryptography primitives are essen-
tial, but a proper optimization of their use onlywhen needed is
demanding and is planned to be studied by using game theory,
as well.
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
In the latter part of this article, we present in Sec. II details of
the gossiping method and the related security vulnerabilities
of the available schemes. Next, Sec. III describes in detail
our approach, while Sec. IV shows the evaluation of charac-
teristics for the proposed strategy. The paper is concluded in
Sec. V with the lessons learned and future research plans.
II. GOSSIPING IN POST-DISASTER PERIODS: PROBLEM
STATEMENT AND RELATED WORKS
As presented in Fig. 3, disaster-resilient routing is typi-
cally implemented using proactive or reactive approaches [8],
[9]. Under proactive schemes, the network is configured
in advance (i.e., before the failure occurrence) with alter-
nate transmission means (e.g., by backup paths or redun-
dant network topology). Damages caused by disasters are
then less likely to compromise the connectivity of network
nodes and the QoS perceived by the users. The reactive
methods are executed after failures and involve either a
dynamic setup of backup paths [9] or redundancy at the
message level [21] (with message retransmissions triggered
after detecting losses).
In general, among schemes based on redundancy at the
message level, we can distinguish either event notification
or application-level schemes. Standards for event notification
schemes, such as Object Management Group Data Distribu-
tion Service for Real-Time Systems (OMG DDS), Advanced
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Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP), or Extensible Mes-
saging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [22], suggest using
TCP to achieve communications resilience. However, TCP
exhibits scalability issues when utilized for reliable multi-
casting and provides only link-by-link guarantees [22], [23],
which are not suitable to assure the end-to-end guarantees.
Several application-level approaches exist within the
literature and support the end-to-end guarantees, among
which retransmission schemes, such as Lateral Error Recov-
ery (LER) [24], Cooperative Error Recovery (CER) [25],
or gossiping [26], are preferable due to their high delivery
success rate. LER and CER are quite complex to implement
as they require global knowledge on the participants in a
group and the topology established among them. In particular,
CER needs the computation of the minimum-loss correla-
tion groups, while LER involves the segmentation of nodes
in distinct planes. Gossiping is simpler and more flexible,
as such knowledge is not required, making it more suit-
able for large-scale infrastructures. Gossiping is a distributed
retransmission scheme that can achieve a consistent view of
received messages among a group of processes within a given
probability. It is thus an example of temporary redundancy
at the message level, as opposed, e.g., to spatial redundancy
where multiple disjoint paths are exploited. It can offer a high
success rate of message delivery with a closed loop of control
provided by temporary redundancy by implying the following
procedures:
(a) running the loss detection (which can be done based on
the elapsed timeouts on the reception of certain mes-
sages or by checking the missing message IDs);
(b) the resulting recovery using retransmissions.
The gossiping scheme can operate in two modes: pull
and push. Its pull mode is based on the periodically com-
menced gossip rounds, where each node randomly selects
peers towards which it sends a summary of the latest received
message IDs so as the destination nodes can detect losses and
request retransmissions. In the push mode, the nodes send the
last received messages so that destinations can recover lost
messages without having to request for any retransmission.
The strength of gossiping is that it exhibits a very high
delivery ratio, even in the case of severe loss patterns and
node/link unavailabilities. However, this is achieved at the
price of the increased network traffic concerning the aug-
mented number of exchangedmessages (by implementing the
selective flooding). This issue can be solved by combining
gossiping with the forward error correction (FEC) code (as
in [27]) to reduce the traffic load without compromising the
achievable delivery success rate.
The comparison of the service-based publish/subscribe
solution using TCP and the one equipped with gossiping
presented in [28] proves higher scalability of latency for gos-
siping than for TCP. With TCP, the latency increases linearly
with the number of destinations, the applied loss rate, and
the source-destination distance. At the same time, gossiping
can only achieve a moderate performance degradation and
exhibits a logarithmic trend, instead of a linear one [28].
Since gossiping implements a closed control loop,
the respective feedback on the utility of the applied redun-
dancy received by the end nodes may be further used to
better tune the redundancy to improve the overall approach
quality, as in [29]. In approaches based on spatial redundancy,
e.g., exchanging additional data to recover lost packets along
a single path or multiple disjoint paths [30], [31], the success
rate depends on the optimal setup of the method (includ-
ing the loss ratio to be tolerated). However, in such cases,
the configuration needs to be optimally determined from the
beginning, as nodes do not receive any feedback during the
operation to adjust it further autonomously. Unfortunately, for
disaster events, such a configuration cannot be appropriately
determined beforehand as a disaster size is typically not
known in advance. It, in turn, leads to either over-estimations
(i.e., higher redundancy than needed, implying a waste
of networking resources) or under-estimations (when the
applied redundancy is not sufficient to cover the experienced
losses, and some non-delivered messages are irremediably
lost).
As discussed above, resilience schemes based on gossiping
are thus well-suited in scenarios of massive failures including
natural disasters and disruptions, technology-related massive
failures, and malicious activities, where the expected extent
of losses is hardly known in advance. In particular, a closed
control loop and the possibility of adjusting the applied
redundancy degree allow gossiping to achieve a high degree
of resilience. Therefore, the publish notification can reach all
the interested subscribers with a high probability [27].
However, a conventional gossiping scheme exhibits vul-
nerabilities which can be exploited in further attacks or to
compromise the applications built on top of gossiping. Over-
coming this issue is thus of utmost importance, especially if
gossiping is applied in critical infrastructures, for instance
in blockchain platforms (such as Hyperledger [32]), power
grids [33] to achieve disaster-resilient event notification [34].
It is worth noting that the presence of malicious nodes
in emergency networks in a post-disaster period is not
a rare event [35], [36] and counteracting them is particularly
demanding. Among the broad spectrum of possible issues,
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are considered extremely
dangerous, and their prevention is of pivotal importance.
First of all, unintentional congestion is typically caused by
a considerable increase of the user traffic in the first phase
after a disaster occurrence (due to activities of humans con-
tacting their dear ones, assessing the situation, or seeking
an escape route). Therefore, in a communication network
already affected by a disaster, it is simple to intentionally
complement the legitimate traffic with fictitious one (to cause
network unavailability, degraded QoS or resource starvation).
When networks are severely affected by a disaster,
ad-hoc networking may become the only viable communi-
cation means [37]. In such a context, a DoS attack has a
significant impact on draining device batteries and causing
disruptions [38]. Its low complexity, combined with the high
effect determines the high risk and importance for prevention.
178654 VOLUME 8, 2020
C. Esposito et al.: Reinforced Secure Gossiping Against DoS Attacks in Post-Disaster Scenarios
Previous works have investigated the use of cryptographic
primitives, majority consensus, or routing monitoring tech-
niques to protect gossiping from various attacks includ-
ing DoS, eavesdropping, Sybil or Byzantine node attacks
[38]–[43]. DoS attack [38] was found to be simple to be per-
formed for gossiping and very disruptive by compromising
the network connectivity and reducing node availability.
Typical approaches to protect gossiping from DoS attacks
use cryptographic primitives (i.e., digital signatures) to avoid
forgery or data injection [39], [40]. However, as shown in [44]
they are affected by space decoupling violations (when the
data source cannot be anonymous to trace back its public key
or digital certificate), scalability issues for identity claims or
certificates, key sharing, and performance worsening, which
makes them not fit well in a post-disaster scenario.
Specifically, post-disaster communications in pub-
lish/subscribe services is data-centric and anonymous in the
sense that subscribers are not aware of the identity of the
publishers responsible for being the sources of specific infor-
mation. It is in contrast to the main cryptographic primitives
as the sender identity must be known to obtain its public
key for decryption or signature verification. The number
of publishers can be massive, as within the affected area
all the on-field first responders, the citizens looking for an
escape path, and other involved actors are publishers and
subscribers of disaster-related data. Therefore, a subscriber
may have to store a large number of certificates or to manage
a large number of keys in the Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) [45], causing excessive use of memory and time. Last,
the majority consensus and routing monitoring are challeng-
ing in disaster-related scenarios, as they demand a global
knowledge on the network topology, which is not feasible
to achieve as mentioned above. It makes safeguarding the
gossip-based communications remain an open issue.
A common approach to address the message loss in com-
munication networks is to resend messages that were not
received by a destination node. In a retransmission-based
scheme, the first phase is to detect the occurrence of message
loss, while the second phase is to trigger the retransmissions
with a proper command [21]. The destination node can recog-
nize the message loss if the identification of two consecutive
messages is not progressive in terms of their numbering. For
instance, the destination node identifies the loss of message 2
after receiving two consecutive messages with their IDs equal
to 1 and 3, respectively. If a loss is detected, the destination
node can send a proper command (such as a negative ACK,
containing the sequence numbers of the missing message) to
trigger the retransmission.
Alternatively, the destination node has to acknowledge the
reception of all the messages. If an ACK is not received
before the expiration of a given timeout, the retransmis-
sion is commenced. It is the Automatic ReQuest (ARQ)
scheme [21] adopted by TCP to achieve reliable communi-
cations [46]. However, a disadvantage of this solution is cen-
tralization of storing and performing the retransmissions of
messages at the data source. As a result, a reliable multicast or
FIGURE 4. Sequence diagram of a generic gossip algorithm.
publish/subscribe service do not scale well with the increase
of the number of interacting nodes [22]. The publisher has to
keep storing the messages unless all destination nodes have
acknowledged their reception, which can quickly saturate its
message queue. Therefore, more distributed solutions have
been proposed [47], [48], among which gossiping [26] is the
most widely used.
Gossiping is a peer-to-peer approach, where all the nodes
run the same algorithm, and involves multiple steps as shown
in Fig. 4. The starting point of the algorithm is the activation
of a node in the overall infrastructure. The algorithm is next
repeatedly executed until the node is not terminated. If a ter-
mination command is triggered, the eventually on-going task
(i.e., the current one in the dashed rectangle in Fig. 4) is
interrupted. However, there are many different variants of
gossiping implementing each of these steps in a specific man-
ner. The first operation relies on determining when a gossip
round should be started (i.e., when the nodes should interact
with each other to detect losses and trigger retransmissions).
The round can be started, e.g., as soon as a new message is
successfully received by one node. However, there is also
a possibility to commence the round only when a proper
timeout expires. It is worth noting that the initiation of the
round is typically characteristic to a given gossiping variant.
The second operation consists in selecting the nodes with
which special messages are exchanged. They are often cho-
sen randomly over the list of available nodes provided by
a sampling service [49], [50]. Recently, specific heuristics
for the node selection have been proposed to optimize given
non-functional properties of the algorithm, such as the per-
formance or the success rate [44]. This operation determines
what kind of information such messages convey: the last
received message or a list of received identifiers. In the latter
case, such a list can be used by the destination node to detect
possible missing messages and to ask for retransmission.
Alternatively, the list can be used to identify a loss occurred
at the sender side to retransmit the missing messages.
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A push gossip typically includes sending the last received
message as soon as it is successfully received. Such a pushing
operation is typically done by the destination node when all
the packets underlying a notification are received. In severely
damaged networks, transit nodes may also be involved in
this procedure. On the contrary, a pull gossip waits a given
timeout before sending the list containing the identifiers of
the latest received messages. The study in [27] proved that
both variants allow achieving high resilience degree with
a random node selection. However, the push one is charac-
terized by lower recovery time, while the pull one exhibits
a lower overhead. Both approaches are very powerful in
the case of multiple (and, in particular, correlated) failures,
as the recovery can occur from multiple nodes within the
network, with a high probability of circumventing damaged
links/nodes. Recovery is thus determined on the fly, without
the pre-configured strategies and routes. In this sense, gos-
siping is a multi-path routing from multiple senders, with
message sending occurring at different moments.
Group management is not part of gossiping but depends
on applications at the higher abstraction level or the over-
lay at the lower level. Publish/subscribe services exhibit an
intrinsic group definition based on subscription mechanisms.
Applications with similar event interests (matching active
subscriptions and/or advertisements) are assumed to be in the
same group so that nodes are classified based on interest,
topic or content-based filtering. Overlays may group nodes
according to their proximity or subnet mechanisms.
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Studies available in the recent literature (e.g., [51]) show that
gossiping, although effective in guaranteeing message deliv-
ery, might encounter security-related issues or be exploited to
perpetrate the following attacks:
– Hub attack – when some nodes fool the others to become
hubs for the overlay established among the gossiping
nodes so that when they suddenly leave, the overlay is
badly fragmented without any hope for recovery,
– Eavesdropping – denoting stealing the data conveyed by
the gossiped messages by honest-but-curious gossipers,
or an adversary controlling a part of the network,
– Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack – to influence the nodes
to send gossip messages towards some nodes to overload
them and affect their performance and availability,
– Sybil attack – with an adversary forging legitimate node
identities to inject fabricated data, such as fake retrans-
mission requests, or replaying a valid request,
– Byzantine or Selfish Behaviour – with byzantine nodes
acting far from the protocol and not actively participat-
ing in supporting the other ones coping with losses.
Due to the crucial role of gossiping in providing resilience
in emergency networks [34] and utilized as a foundation
block in key ICT platforms such as the blockchain [32]
or vehicular networks [52], it is demanding to design its
secure implementation by protecting the overall algorithm
from these attacks and avoiding possible misuses. Moreover,
emergency networks are characterized by a large scale con-
cerning the number of connected nodes and the amount of
generated data. Gossiping can cope with multiple failures
within the network and to achieve high data delivery guar-
antees, as proved in [26], [27]. However, the gossip protocol
needs to be enhanced with proper means to counteract the
attacks mentioned above and the peculiar requirements of
emergency networks. To be efficient, the secure and resilient
communication protocol in post-disaster periods also needs
to scale well with the increase of the size of the network in
particular in the context of:
(a) low latency (as messages may be time-constrained, and,
therefore, they should be received fast),
(b) low energy consumption profile (as devices may have
limited battery and cannot be recharged),
(c) high delivery success rate, despite the possible message
losses caused by network failures,
which is certainly hard to assure for non-anonymous commu-
nications with a centralized authority/identity management.
B. ANALYSIS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART LITERATURE
Within the context of emergency networks, DoS attacks
are considered extremely dangerous, since they are easy to
implement and capable of severe damages to the network by
making certain key nodes unavailable. Therefore, protection
against them is of pivotal importance [36]. In this section,
we provide an overview of the main solutions for DoS pro-
tection for gossiping. Also, we describe those means with
the primary objective to protect against the other attacks, but
which can be useful for DoS attacks as well.
Another notable example is provided in [51], where Sybil
attacks are avoided by the Oracle Certificate Authority (CA)
service assigning identities to gossiping participants so that
malicious adversaries cannot forge identities. Moreover,
paper [51] suggests to limit the number of accepted requests
per round, to bound the damages applied by DoS attacks.
However, it comes at the expense of higher performance
and energy consumption and lower scalability guarantees.
First, it is mandatory to know the sender identity to ver-
ify the signatures attached to the exchanged messages. One
way is to contact a trusted service to retrieve the sender
certificate from which the public key is obtained to ver-
ify signatures. Concerning event notification largely used
in emergency networks, spatial decoupling is necessary to
achieve flexibility and efficiency, but signature verification
demands to know the sender identity by violating anonymity.
Moreover, signing and verifying messages has a computa-
tional and performance cost, which may be an obstacle to
resource-constrained nodes. These existing solutions for DoS
protection leveraging on cryptographic primitives [39], [40],
[51], [53] are inefficient due to:
– anonymity violations (without knowing the sender pub-
lic key verified using its identity by PKI, the receiver
cannot decrypt the exchanged messages),
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– scalability issues to manage the identity claims and cer-
tificates (receivers have to store the cryptographic data
for all senders, progressively losing memory space),
– performance and energy costs (encryption and decryp-
tion introduce communication delay, and imply consid-
erable energy and computing resource consumption).
A different approach is proposed in [54], where nodes
consider the received gossiped messages to be valid if many
replicas of such amessage are delivered frommany peers over
a given threshold, equal to t+1, where t is half of the overall
number of nodes in the system. Despite protecting against
false requests and gossip messages used to perform DoS
attacks, such a solution increases the algorithm convergence
time to reach a consensus (i.e., when all the interested nodes
receive a given message). Such a more substantial conver-
gence time causes an increase in communication latency,
and the higher number of messages needed for the protocol
convergence implies higher energy consumption. Therefore,
in the current literature several similar solutions, such as [41],
[42] were proposed to reduce the convergence time by low-
ering the number of nodes needed for obtaining the majority,
or by using the contextual information to identify the genuine
gossip messages (such as characterizing neighbouring nodes’
identities or location information). For this purpose, disjoint
paths are used for fast convergence at the expense of larger
messages (e.g., any time gossip messages are exchanged, they
carry all the respective contextual details).
A different remedy for DoS attacks is presented in [38]
by sending the pull gossip messages (i.e., when digests are
transmitted) to publicly known ports while retransmitting to
randomly selected ports, and randomly picking messages to
exchange from digests to prevent from being overwhelmed
by bogus messages. Besides DoS protection, there is always
the other side of the coin: such a solution increases the
convergence time and lowers the gossip reliability degree.
The avoidance of sybil attacks without using cryptographic
primitives has been extensively investigated in the current
literature. A possible approach is to leverage on trust man-
agement, as proposed in [43] to detect malicious nodes and
exclude them from gossiping to prevent from DoS attacks.
However, such an approach requires a proper certificate or
identity management and is characterized by the consequent
efficiency, scalability and anonymity limitations.
Routing monitoring is crucial against Hub attacks as it
enables excluding the nodes with a high number of outgoing
connections. Although it is particularly simple in theory,
performing node monitoring by identifying the outgoing con-
nections is far from being easy to implement in real settings.
One way is proposed in [49] and involves monitoring the peer
sampling, which is a service to provide nodes with the ability
to know the identifiers of the other nodes in the network
and to measure the structural prestige of nodes in a network.
Such a solution is not able to exclude nodes launching DoS
attacks, which do not typically have a structural prestige
but are composed of a group of nodes that won’t stand out.
A more distributed approach is proposed in [55] where each
node holds multiple neighbour lists to identify malicious
nodes and obtain a secure peer sampling service even able
to cope with DoS attacks. In [56], game theory is used to
design the ‘‘incentive and punishment’’ scheme to avoid self-
ish/byzantine behaviour of free-riders. This solution cannot
deal with DoS attacks as the adversary nodes do not execute
such a scheme and can still overload the other nodes with
requests.
The summary of the pros and cons of the existing solutions
is presented in Tab. 1. Some of them, despite being not
designed especially for DoS attacks, can be adapted/extended
to address them. Existing approaches to counteract DoS
attacks are characterized by limited scalability. For most of
them, the convergence time of the gossiping is increased,
implying higher latency and energy consumption, and a
lower delivery rate. As discussed in this section, post-disaster
emergency networks may be compromised by multiple fail-
ures, which limits the routing monitoring and secure peer
sampling.
To overcome these problems, we propose here a
non-cryptographic approach to overcome DoS attacks by
exploiting the game theory to achieve a smarter node selec-
tion. The adoption of game theory does not present the
drawbacksmentioned above and is used for protection against
selfish attacks of free-riders.
It is worth noting that although DoS attacks are typically
associated with the intentional congestion of the network,
a similar effect can occur unintentionally. Indeed, congestion
can also happen due to user traffic spikes combined with the
overhead imposed by gossiping (in terms of the additional
messages needed to cope with losses). There is a body of
literature to make gossiping efficient by reducing the number
of required messages to recover from network misbehaviour.
In [57], message suppression is presented, where authors
statistically modelled the probability of firing messages or
silencing them to keep the new information propagation with
a lower overhead. In [58], gossiping to members farther away
is made less frequently than to nearby nodes, so that the
network overhead is kept reduced. These solutions cannot be
applied to the intentional starvation of resources or conges-
tion since they are only meant to make the protocol more
effective but not to prevent a node (or a group of nodes) from
directing too much traffic towards some of the neighbouring
nodes. As shown in the remaining part of this article, in our
proposal, we have extended them to reduce the overhead of
the protocol by avoiding the unnecessary traffic, but also by
not automatically replying to an incoming request, where the
sender identity may be forged or spoofed. The reply can be
decided based on its utility.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
This section presents our approach to protect the gossip pro-
tocol against DoS attacks without the need to use the crypto-
graphic primitives. We leverage on a proper node and request
selection mechanism to maximize the protocol utility using
a game-theoretic formulation and a reinforcement learning
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TABLE 1. A summary overview of the existing literature on secure gossiping.
scheme. We base our work on our previous study on reducing
the gossiping overhead [44], extending it towards protection
against DoS attacks by optimizing not only the selection of
the destinations of the gossip messages but also the deci-
sion to reply to or ignore the incoming requests. It is done
by integrating simple trust management from feedback (as
in [43] without a central authority) with the game-theoretic
approach applied not only to gossipers (as in [56]) but also to
the gossip receivers. The solution we propose in this article
is suitable for post-disaster periods as it does not depend on
any centralized authority needed for identification, trust, and
certificate management, but exploits the distributed decision
making formalized here as a non-cooperative game.
In particular, in Sec. III-A we explain the optimization
model for finding the optimal solution to the considered
gossiping problem. However, due to its centralized nature
and the related scalability problems, we describe it here as
a reference model only, while in Sect. III-B, we introduce
the respective non-cooperative game to enable the real-time
operation of gossiping in a distributed scenario. Section III-C
describes the proposal of learning capability introduced to the
game to cope with the uncertainty of the payoff functions.
A. GOSSIPING OPTIMIZATION
Gossiping is a stateless protocol with amessage flow depicted
in Fig. 5(a). ADoS attack attempt can be conducted by a set of
malicious nodes faking gossip/request messages on behalf of
a target node to push the contacted nodes to flood the target
FIGURE 5. The correct message flow (a), and during a DoS attack (b).
with requests or retransmissions, as illustrated in Fig. 5(b).
It is possible since the nodes do not remember the sent gossip
messages. Introducing a state within the protocol to cope with
DoS attacks can cause issues in an unpredictable network
environment such as the Internet. On the contrary, by apply-
ing the message suppression concept originally introduced
for the congestion control [57], we can avoid the necessity
to reply to fake messages by measuring a utility function.
A typical solution for the congestion control in gossip
protocols consists of defining a utility function related to
destination selection, as investigated in our earlier work [44].
Such a function allows a node to decide with which other
nodes to gossip, to avoid contacting those nodes which are
not in need. To protect against DoS attacks, we also define
the utility of replying to an incoming request based on such
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a utility. Specifically, in both cases, a node has to make the
optimal choice by considering if this step will allow it to
recover from a loss and avoid exchanging messages which
would be finally recognized as waste. Formally, given a set
L of all nodes n within the system, we can define a function
named h(k)i,j taking the value of 1 if the message sent by the
ith node to the jth node in the kth round was useful to recover
a lost message (0, otherwise). In [44], function h was only
related to the utility of a sent gossip message. In this work,
as presented in formula (1), this function consists of two
components: ĥ(k)i,j coming from our earlier work [44], and
h
(k)
i,j introduced here to measure the utility of replying to the
incoming messages.
h(k)i,j = ĥ
(k)
i,j + h
(k)
i,j (1)
The first function ĥ(k)i,j is assigned the value of 1 if the gossip
message sent by the ith node to the jth node in the kth round
has been useful (i.e., the probability that message m is within
the set Mn of received messages of node n after sending the
gossip message mi,j is equal to 1):
ĥ(k)i,j =
{
1 ∃m ∈ M : P(m ∈ Mn|mi,j) = 1, n ∈ L
0 6 ∃m ∈ M : P(m ∈ Mn|mi,j) = 1, n ∈ L
(2)
The right part (h
(k)
i,j ) of formula (1) is equal to 1 if a message
sent by the ith node to the jth node in the kth round after
having received a request (namely ri,j) has been useful:
h
(k)
i,j =
{
1 ∃m ∈ M : P(m ∈ Mn|ri,j) = 1, n ∈ L
0 6 ∃m ∈ M : P(m ∈ Mn|ri,j) = 1, n ∈ L
(3)
The utility for a given node i at a given kth round, namely
U (k)i , can be expressed as the product of function h
(k)
i,j from
formula (1) with x(k)i,j , which is equal to 1 if the ith node
has sent a message to node j during the kth round, summed
up for all the nodes and the performed rounds, as given in
formula (4).
U (k)i =
1
f (i)out + r
(i)
in
∑
j6=i
x(k)i,j h
(k)
i,j (4)
where:
• f (i)out indicates the fanout of the protocol, i.e., the number
of messages to be sent at each round,
• r (i)in indicates the number of received requests.
The division by the sum of values f (i)out and r
(i)
in in formula (4)
is needed to keep the utility function U (k)i returning a value
within [0, 1] range. To distinguish the utility of gossiping
and the one of replying, we introduce two sets of decision
variables:
• x̂(k)ij equal to 1 if the ith node sends a gossip message to
node j ∈ L during the kth round (0, otherwise),
• x(k)ij equal to 1 if the ith node replies to an incom-
ing request from node j ∈ L during the kth round
(0, otherwise).
By splitting function h(k)i,j into two separate parts related to
formulas (2) and (3), accordingly, utility functionU (k)i can be
then extended as follows:
U (k)i =
1
f (i)out
∑
j6=i
x̂(k)i,j ĥ
(k)
i,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Û (k)i
+
1
r (i)in
∑
j6=i
x(k)i,j h
(k)
i,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
(k)
i
= Û (k)i + U
(k)
i (5)
where Û (k)i indicates the utility for sending the gossiping
messages to the selected nodes, while U
(k)
i is the utility of
replying to certain incoming requests, both achieved by the
ith node during the kth round.
By summing all such functions over all already started
rounds k for all nodes in the system, we obtain the overall
gossip utility U as given in formula (6).
U =
1
N
N∑
i=0
1
R
R∑
k=0
U (k)i =
1
N
N∑
i=0
1
R
R∑
k=0
(
Û (k)i + U
(k)
i
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=0
1
R
R∑
k=0
Û (k)i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ûi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Û
+
1
N
N∑
i=0
1
R
R∑
k=0
U
(k)
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
U i︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
(6)
where N is the total number of nodes within a large-scale
system, while R is the total number of the already started
rounds.
Such a utility function has two interpretations. Firstly, Ûi
represents the number of gossip messages that have triggered
retransmissions over the total number of messages sent by the
node i. Secondly, when a node has to reply to a request, U i
can denote the number of retransmitted messages useful to
recover a loss over the total number of messages received by
the node i. Û and U are respectively the mean of Ûi and U i
over the total number of nodes.
Our previous work [44] aims at only optimizing Û (not
the overall utility function U , as we focus on in this article).
Moreover, while the optimization of the Û part is mainly tai-
lored to the congestion control and the overheadminimization
related to the gossip protocol, the maximization of U in this
article allows us to prevent from DoS attack attempts.
When optimizing the gossip protocol, it is essential to max-
imize such a utility function given in formula (6) by making
the right decisions to achieve a high resilience degree so
that the gossip messages are sent towards those nodes which
need them. However, this is not the case for a conventional
gossiping scheme. In particular, we proved in [59] that the
value of U is low in the case of the optimal selection of the
nodes (i.e., when a node sends a gossip message only towards
the nodes which need it), and further decreases when f (i)out is
increased. In addition to strengthening resilience, optimizing
the utility U is also necessary for security, and to protect
against DoS attacks aimed at sending the retransmission
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requests to multiple nodes on behalf of the targeted node.
By optimizing the utility U, those contacted nodes can avoid
replying to such fake requests (and thus not overload the
target nodes, respectively).
The problem of finding the node with which a given
node can gossip has been formulated in [44] by the opti-
mization model to maximize the utility function Û given
by formula (6). In particular, to address protection against
DoS attacks, the overall problem of determining whether
to send gossip messages toward given nodes or to reply to
specific incoming requests can be formulated as done in [44],
extended with the utility partU for the DoS attack protection.
Let us consider a set of variables ρ(k)i indicating the
obtained reliability of the message delivery for the ith node,
computed at the kth round. The objective is to find during
a given kth round the proper values for the decision variables
in x̂(k)i,j and x
(k)
i,j to maximize the utility and the achievable
reliability at the overall system level (as both are equally
important, we sum them up):
max
1
N
N∑
i=0
(
Ûi + U i
)
+
1
NR
N∑
i=0
ρi︷ ︸︸ ︷
R∑
k=0
ρ
(k)
i
=
N∑
i=0
R∑
k=0
∑
j6=i
(
x̂(k)i,j ĥ
(k)
i,j + x
(k)
i,j h
(k)
i,j
)
NR
(
f (i)out + r
(i)
in
) + 1
N
N∑
i=0
ρi, (7)
subject to: ∑
j∈L
x̂(k)i,j ≤ f
(i)
out (8)∑
j∈L
x(k)i,j ≤ r
(i)
in (9)
x̂(k)i,j , x
(k)
i,j ∈ [0, 1] (10)
ĥ(k)i,j , h
(k)
i,j ∈ [0, 1] (11)
0 ≤ ρ(k)i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ L (12)
Constraints (8), (9) indicate that a node cannot send more
than f (i)out gossip messages and replies to more than r
(i)
in
received requests, accordingly. Constraints (10), (11), (12)
express the admissible values for the decision variables and
the objective functions.
Here, maximizing the utility function makes evident the
added-value of our solution by using a strategy of gossip
message suppression not only to optimize the overhead of
the protocol (obtained by maximizing function Ûi) but also
to deal with DoS attacks (obtained by maximizing function
U i). It allows us to protect the scheme from these attacks
without the need for using cryptography while fulfilling at
the same time the requirements on fast delivery of messages
in post-disaster scenarios.
The overhead of the ‘‘plain’’ gossip protocol and the pro-
posed DoS-resistant one can be kept as minimal as possible,
in particular, if the problem is approached in a centralized
manner by a node with a global knowledge on the overall
system (by collecting statistics by the respective distributed
snapshot algorithm [60]). In this case, the resolution can be
made through a Mixed-Integer Program (MIP) formulated
above, or by relaxing the integral constraints and solving the
corresponding pure Linear Program (LP). Such a solution
is simple to implement and allows us to obtain the optimal
decisions. However, since this approach requires the global
knowledge of the lost messages for each node to be able to
make the best choice, it is unfeasible in a large-scale scenario.
Moreover, even if assuming the possibility to acquire
global knowledge, the model still exhibits severe scalability
limitations prejudicing its usage in systems consisting of
a large number of nodes. The time necessary for collecting
the loss statistics by a given central decision node increases
exponentially with the number of nodes within the multicast
tree, as the system is asynchronous [61]. Also, the memory
required to store all the received data and the load resulting
from resolving the optimization problem may overwhelm the
resources of the central decision node. As a result, it may
become infeasible to make any decision at all.
A better approach is to distribute the resolution duties
among all the nodes, as considered in the following part of
this section, by relying on the local decisions based on the
local knowledge acquired by the neighbouring nodes. Such an
approach has the strength of overcoming the scalability issues
for large systems. However, as discussed later in this article,
this advantage comes at the price of obtaining a solution that
is relatively far from the optimal one.
B. FORMULATION OF A NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
Among the possible means for a distributed optimization,
we have adopted a resolution method based on game the-
ory [62]. The reason for this choice is that game theory
inverts the typical resolution approach into a distributed
optimization [63]. It does not require to divide the overall
optimization task into independent sub-problems, one per
each node, and to define a proper supervision mechanism
to make all the sub-problems converging towards the global
optimum. On the contrary, the game theory allows reaching
the optimal solution, even without imposing any complex
coordination and supervision protocols among the nodes.
It makes the proposed approach suitable for post-disaster
scenarios as the latency and overhead of the gossiping scheme
is kept minimal, and massive failures in the network can
only slightly influence the approach. As the optimization is
conducted using local decision and local knowledge on the
overall problem without any supervision and coordination,
the method is meant to scale well even for a high number of
nodes. In the rest of this subsection, the overall cooperative
game will be introduced and analyzed.
In our approach, we have a set P = c1, c2, · · · , cN of play-
ers of a finite size N ≥ 2, each player associated with each
node of the communication system. A node cannot host more
than one player. The players simultaneously decide whether
to reply or not to requests received from the other players,
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FIGURE 6. A general idea of the proposed approach.
to recover the maximum number of messages dropped at
the requesting nodes and to minimize the relative overhead.
Formally, the set of strategies for each player is defined as S.
A strategy of any player is the selection of a set of the other
players (which can even be null) with whom it is allowed to
communicate by sending a gossip message and/or replying
to their requests. Based on the adopted strategy, indicated as
sj, the proper action is conducted by the jth player, namely oj
among the set of allowed actionsOj(sj), i.e., sending a certain
message according to the gossip algorithm. All the players
have the same set of strategies, and there are no differences
in their strategy sets.
In our game, we consider the nodes being structured in a
tree, as many content-based publish/subscribe services estab-
lish a tree-based overlay [64], where each node is placed in a
given layer, as shown in Fig. 6. For example, the root node
is in layer 0, the children of the root node are in layer 1,
and so on. The strategy for a player is given by an integer
number from [1, λ] interval, where λ is the highest layer
within the tree (i.e., with the lowest number). The output
of the player after the kth round is a random selection of
f (k)out reachable nodes belonging to the layer indicated by the
strategy to which this player sends gossip messages or replies
to the received requests. Combining the strategy sets of all
the players, namely S = Sc1 × Sc2 × · · · × Scp , a strategy
profile s ∈ S implies certain payoffs to each player c,
namely 8c(s), which are aggregated in the so-called profiles
of payoffs denoted as π . The payoff is the gain for the player
to gossip with a set of nodes. Specifically, in our game,
player c receives gain for having one of its messages being
useful for a node during the previous kth round, i.e., being
able to recover a lost message over the total number of sent
messages:
8c(s) = α

∑
i∈L
h(k)i,j∑
i∈L
x(k)i,j
+ ρ
(k)
i
 (13)
where α is a weight within the (0, 1) interval, s contains the
vector of decision variables xi,j, being the sum of x̂
(k)
i,j and x
(k)
i,j ,
while h(k)i,j is the sum of ĥ
(k)
i,j and h
(k)
i,j .
The scope of the game is to determine the best strategy
profile s∗ that implies the maximum payoff for all the players,
expressed by formula (7) distributed among the players.
s∗ ∈ argmax
s∈S
∑
i∈L
∑
j6=i
(
x̂(k)i,j ĥ
(k)
i,j +x
(k)
i,j h
(k)
i,j
)
N
(
f (i)out+r
(i)
in
) + 1
N
∑
i∈L
ρ
(k)
i (14)
By having each player to maximize their payoff function in
formula (13), we have a distributed approach for the optimiza-
tion of formula (7), where the players are myopic, in the sense
that they update their gossiping strategy based on instanta-
neous parameters and feedback, while ignoring the future
implications of their actions. It is suitable in a post-disaster
scenario as no centralized resolution is used. Compared to the
strategy from [44], here we do not only consider the utility
when sending the gossip messages but also when replying to
the incoming requests.
In our game, players are selfish, i.e., there is no direct com-
munications between the players, and each one only cares to
maximize its own profit or to minimize its own costs without
considering the state of the other players (with the eventu-
ality of unintentionally damaging them). Then, the game is
defined non-cooperative, and its standard form is given by
0 = (P, S, π) to maximize the payoff for all the players.
C. STRATEGIC LEARNING FOR PAYOFF
CHARACTERIZATION
In a typical application of game theory, the payoff functions
of the players are assumed to be well known and externally
given, as a part of the game formalization. In our case,
however, the payoff functions for each player are not given
in advance, as it is not possible to predict the impact and
the effect of disasters to the network and its constituents.
Also, disaster-related failures may activate at different time
instants. Therefore, it is crucial to have a learning scheme
for post-disaster resilience by having the payoff functions to
be dynamically computed based on the feedback provided by
the contacted nodes. To address this challenge, we propose
to utilize the concept of a distributed strategic learning [66],
where each player can learn from the received feedback to
create a payoff value and to determine if a given strategy is
the best response, as shown in Fig. 6. Specifically, following
our earlier work [44], here we also apply the COmbined fully
DIstributed PAyoff and Strategy-RL (CODIPAS-RL) [66],
which is a learning scheme derived from the strategy and
payoff (Q-learning) Reinforcement Learning.
Let us denote by pj,t (sj) the probabilities of the jth player
to choose strategy sj at time t , and pj,t = [pj,t (sj)]sj∈Aj ∈ Pj
be a mixed strategy of the jth player. Moreover, we indicate
by ĝj,t the perceived payoff at time t and gj,t+1 is the col-
lected feedback at time t + 1 for the selected strategy sj.
CODIPAS-RL works as follows. At time-slot t = 0, each
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player chooses strategy s and derives from it action o to
be performed. Then, it receives feedback for its action and
builds a numerical value of its payoff. The payoff is properly
initialized to gj,0. In time-slot t > 0, each player having an
estimation of its payoffs, namely gj,t , chooses strategy pj,t+1
for the next time-slot, which is a function of only the previous
strategy pj,t , the estimated payoff gj,t and the target value
for the payoff function. The game moves to time-slot t+1.
Such a scheme is combined with a proper payoff and learning
strategy leading to CODIPAS-RL with the Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution as a strategy mapping, formulated as follows:{
pj,t+1(sj) = (1− λj,t )pj,t + λj,t β̃j,εj (ĝj,t , sj)
ĝj,t+1(sj) = ĝj,t (sj)+ νj,tα{oj,t+1∈Oj(sj)}δg
,
j ∈ [1,N ], t ≥ 0, oj,t ∈ Oj(sj),
δg = gj,t+1 − ĝj,t (sj);
(15)
where β̃j,εj is the strategy mapping expressed as a softmax
function (i.e., a function turning a vector of a given number
K of real values into a vector of the same number K of real
values that sum up to 1):
β̃j,εj (ĝj,t , sj) =
e
1
εj
ĝj,t (sj)∑
s′j∈S
j
e
1
εj
ĝj,t (s
′
j)
,
sj ∈ S j, j ∈ [1,N ]
(16)
where εj is a parameter assigned to the jth node, which
is either identical or different for all the players, and rep-
resents the player rationality. When ε is closer to zero,
the mapping returns the strategy offering the highest pay-
off. For ε closer to 1, the mapping makes a fully random
strategy selection. As we aim at having mixed strategies,
we assume all the players have the same rationality level:
∀i 6= j : εi = εj = 0.1.
The upper part in formula (15) referring to pj,t+1 defines
the selection of the strategy to be used, while the lower
part (i.e., ĝj,t+1(sj)) updates the payoff based on the received
feedback. λj,t is the strategy learning rate that may vary from
player to player and/or during the learning process. The active
strategy of the player is indicated by α{oj,t+1∈Oj(sj)} taking the
value of 1, if action oj,t has been played by the jth player
at time t; 0 otherwise. This implies that only the component
corresponding to the action that has been played is updated.
The stable solution for such a formula can be assumed as the
equilibrium for a modified game, where the game payoff is
perturbed with an extra entropy part (to indicate its depen-
dence on the loss pattern applied by the network dynamics
and the actions of the other players).
D. GAME ANALYSIS
The scope of this subsection is to provide a formal analysis of
the proposed approach to find a solution to the optimization
problem expressed in Eq. 7. In particular, we first start by
studying the existence of Nash Equilibria representing the
widely known solution concept for non-cooperative games
as the one described in Subsection III-B. Then, we motivate
the need for the application of the reinforcement learning
approach, as a case of amixed non-cooperative game repeated
over the time, as mentioned in Subsection III-C, and verify if
such an approach is able to provide a solution for Eq. 7. The
applied learning scheme can result in Price of Anarchy (PoA)
(i.e., the distance, in terms of the objective functions to be
optimised, of the Nash Equilibria with the Pareto front) being
lower than the one achieved with the naive non-cooperative
game formulation [81].
Given a particular strategy s ∈ S, it is not profitable for a
player to select a different node than the one in the current
strategy profile since moving to a neighbour node will not
change (or even reduce) the achievable payoff. In other words,
such a player thus has no incentive to change its strategy.
The demonstration of the existence of Nash Equilibria is typi-
cally resolved using theorems by making proper assumptions
of the characteristics of certain elements of the game, e.g.,
as presented in [65]. A game can have a deterministic or
probabilistic nature: it is possible to take pure strategies, i.e.,
to pick a single action and play it, or mixed ones, i.e., to have
strategies with a random selection over the set of available
actions according to some probability distribution. Specifi-
cally, the existence of at least one pure Nash Equilibrium is
proved if function (13) is continuous and non-positive in the
strategy set. This can be proved if the second derivative is
non-positive. It is not too complex to compute that
∂28c(s)
∂s2
=
2αH
s3
(17)
as α and H =
∑
i∈L
h(k)i,j are both non-negative, the second
derivative is always positive for s being positive, which is
true by definition. Therefore, the Nash Equilibrium is not
guaranteed to exist. However, mixed-strategy games, such as
the one investigated in this article, always have at least one
Nash equilibrium [62], so our gossiping approach considers
a mixed-strategy formulation, which is a set of probability
distributions over the actions linked to the strategy profile s
expressed by pj,t+1(sj) in Eq. 15. Randomization is mainly
needed in our approach as players are uncertain about the
other players’ action and the predictability of the loss rate
applied by the network.
In the proposed work, the mixed-strategy game is repeated
over the time, with reinforcement learning used to update
the payoff estimation and to determine the best response.
Based on the results of the work in [80], it has been proved
that the strategic learning applied in this work converges to
the so-called rest point (i.e., a case in which players do not
change their applied strategy despite the provided feedback)
in a limited number of iterations. The Folk Theorem adapted
to the evolutionary games indicates such a rest point as the
Nash Equilibrium of the expected game [82]. Therefore,
the demonstration by using the Banach-Picard fixed point the-
orem contained in [66] shows that at the convergence of the
adopted CODIPAS-RL, the reached rest point is a Wardrop
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FIGURE 7. Implementation of the proposed solution.
Equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium for a modified game with
the payoff in Eq. 13 perturbed with an extra entropy term,
which helps to overcome the local optimal points and reach-
ing a global one maximising Eq. 7.
The convergence towards the global optimum in a given
limited number of iterations depends on the quality of the
used approximation function for the payoff and strategy map-
ping. The used Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution is a smooth best
response function and has proved to be an excellent function
for this scope [66]. In fact, in the reinforcement learning liter-
ature, it is known that the softmax decision process, as Eq. 16,
is beneficial [83] in situations where the players have to deter-
mine if applying a known but possibly sub-optimal action
(i.e., playing the same action of the previous stage assuming
the network conditions have not been changed considerably)
or to explore a risky but more rewarding one (i.e., playing
a different action betting that the network conditions have
considerably changed).
IV. ASSESSMENT
This section has the scope of presenting the experimental
results showing the achievable quality of our solution in terms
of:
– scalability measured as the increase of the end-to-end
latency due to the increase of the network and/or disaster
scale,
– reliability measured as the success rate, i.e., the percent-
age of correctly delivered messages over the sent ones,
– security defined as the overall utility of the approach
being not compromised by a DoS attack attempt,
– overhead, i.e., the additional traffic generated by the
approach in terms of the number of packets per link,
– efficiency measured as the power consumed to run the
protection means.
In this section, after highlighting details of the testbed
and the experimental setup in Section IV-A, the analysis of
characteristics of our gossiping approach is divided into two
parts. The first one (Section IV-B) presents the performance
of our scheme in the post-disaster period for the three consid-
ered scenarios of disasters (i.e., natural disasters, attacks and
technology-related disasters) assuming no DoS attacks in that
period. Section IV-C, in turn, is to verify the usability of our
scheme assuming that the network already suffering from the
disaster is additionally affected in the post-disaster period by
a DoS attack.
A. TESTBED AND SETUP DESCRIPTION
We implemented our scheme in OMNET++, which is an
event-based simulator for networks and distributed sys-
tems [67]. Specifically, we deployed our approach on top of
the existing OMNET++ modules implementing Pastry [68]
and Scribe [64]. The first one realizes a Distributed Hash
Table (DHT) overlay with routing implemented based on a
circular hash table’s key-space. In contrast, the second one
realizes a topic-based publish-subscribe service on top of Pas-
try. Losses of messages are implemented over Scribe using
our gossiping module optimized by the proposed approach
to discipline the node selection and request replies. We have
emulated a data-centric application for post-disaster recovery,
periodically sending data of 23 kB. It resembles the behaviour
of rescue teams and/or city administrators regularly broad-
casting data to help citizens escape or get information on the
current conditions in the affected area. The publication rate
has been set to 1 message per second. We are not considering
the mobility of the nodes in our simulations because studies,
such as the one in [79], proved that mobility and the con-
sequent topological changes are not an obstacle to gossiping
and help speeding up the convergence of themessage delivery
to all interested nodes. Moreover, the infrastructure nodes,
such as base stations and routers, are fixed and not mobile
by definition. At the same time, the mobility of end users is
constrained due to the disaster itself, for instance, by a fire or
a volcano eruption. In fact, users in such cases tend to move
along the escape and rescue routes to the assembly points.
The links among the routers in the emulated network were
assumed to be characterized by a mean delay value of 50ms.
In such a simulation, the root generates the data to be dis-
tributed along the tree. A pull-based gossip has been imple-
mented, where after the expiration of two seconds, a gossip
request is sent to those nodes optimally determined by maxi-
mizing the utility function from Eq. 6. We have modified the
router’s implementation provided by the INET framework in
OMNET++ by inserting a piece of software emulating the
message losses. It can be tuned by using two parameters:
the Packet Loss Rate (PLR) being the probability of losing
a packet, and the Average Burst Length (ABL) denoting
the mean number of consecutive messages lost by the net-
work. The link loss process has been modelled regarding the
Gilbert-Elliott model [69], depicted in Fig. 8. It consists of
the 1-st order Markov chain model having only two states: a
‘‘Good’’ state and a ‘‘Bad’’ one, each characterized by a given
probability to lose packets. In our simulations, the probability
of losing packets when the model is in the first (i.e., ‘‘Good’’)
state is 0, while such a probability is equal to 1 if the model is
in the second (i.e., ‘‘Bad’’) state. The model is characterized
by four transition probabilities to change a state from the
current one:
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FIGURE 8. Schematic overview of the Gilbert-Elliott model.
(i) P is the probability of shifting to the ‘‘Bad’’ state when
the current state is ‘‘Good’’,
(ii) 1–P is the probability of remaining in the ‘‘Good’’ state,
(iii) Q is the probability of shifting to the ‘‘Good’’ state
when the current state is ‘‘Bad’’; and last,
(iv) 1–Q is the probability of remaining in the ‘‘Bad’’ state.
Given PLR and ABL, it is possible to compute P and Q as
follows [70]:
P =
PLR · Q
1− PLR
Q = ABL−1. (18)
The three disaster cases, all having the same values forPLR
and ABL, were simulated as follows:
– Case A to model the natural disasters causing fail-
ures confined to a given area, which can be emulated
by enabling the message loss only for those routers
within a given cluster. This is performed by select-
ing a router that fails together with all its neighbour-
ing ones until the total number of faulty routers is
reached.
– Case B to represent malicious attacks in the communi-
cation network modelled by enabling the message loss
for the routers within the core of the network topology
having a high number of connections, and leaving those
at the edge without the message loss enabled.
– Case C referring to the technology-related disasters
which can be modelled by tuning the message loss
within all the routers at random. In such scenarios, a DoS
attack attempt is modelled by having a certain percent-
age of nodes sending requests for random messages to
a given node, and the destinations of such fake requests
are randomly selected among the available nodes in the
tree.
By using such a module, we have simulated the three
envisioned disaster scenarios by randomly selecting PLR and
ABL higher than 0 for the nodes belonging to specific portions
of the network, depending on the post-disaster case to be
simulated. Specifically, we have configured for the faulty
routers PLR being around 0.2, and ABL consisting of 3
packets, respectively, which are the values assumed for faulty
networks also in other similar disaster-related evaluations
(see, e.g., [71], [72]). On the contrary, for healthy routers we
have left a 0 value for both PLR and ABL.
DoS attacks were modelled by allowing a percentage of
application nodes to simulate the fake replies by waiting for
a specific time to send a fake request and trigger the unneeded
FIGURE 9. Communication latency for Case A when varying the number
of nodes for Success Rate = 1 when using gossiping.
retransmissions. The simulated network was composed of
1024 nodes connected by 100 routers. The topology of the
routers and application nodes has been designed by using the
ReaSE framework,1 which offers a graphical user interface
for generation of Network Description (NED) files including
a realistic topology to be used in OMNET++ simulations.
Specifically, among the available Internet topology models,
the one selected for our experiments has been the Heuristi-
cally Optimal Topology (HOT) model from [73].
B. EVALUATION WITHOUT DoS ATTACKS
In the first set of experiments, we analyzed the scalability
of the classic gossiping protocol (i.e., without having our
solution applied), by presenting the results related to the end-
to-end latency of the used publish/subscribe service without
gossip (using only Scribe) and with gossip. We performed
our experiments for multiple cases defined by varying the
number of nodes and the number of faulty routers, to show
the scalability of the communication protocol considering the
horizontal scale of the system. In this scenario, all the routers
were assumed to obtain random values of PLR and ABL.
Results presented in Fig. 9 for Case A show that both
methods encounter an increasing trend when augmenting
the number of nodes. However, the overhead added by the
gossiping is slightly dependent on the number of nodes
(i.e., the additional latency is 30% on average). This slight
dependence on the scale of the system is due to the decen-
tralized approach of gossiping to loss recovery (i.e., with
the increase of the number of nodes, more retransmission
sources are available which are closer to the requesting nodes,
which increases the probability to recover a message and
its consequent overhead). As our approach adds a limited
additional latency, Fig. 9 shows its usability in post-disaster
periods.
Next, we evaluated the reliability of our gossiping scheme
by focusing on the achievable success rate for the three major
disaster cases A-C described in Section IV-A. Fig. 10 shows
the achievable success rate (considered here as the measure
1https://omnetpp.org/download-items/ReaSE.html
178664 VOLUME 8, 2020
C. Esposito et al.: Reinforced Secure Gossiping Against DoS Attacks in Post-Disaster Scenarios
FIGURE 10. Success rate over the different cases A-C as a function of the
number of contacted nodes to gossip with (i.e., fanout).
FIGURE 11. Success rate for Case A for different percentages of faulty
routers as a function of the fanout.
of reliability) over three different runs of our simulation
with 10% of faulty routers in the three different identified
cases of disaster scenarios by increasing the applied fanout
(i.e., the number of contacted nodes to gossip with). We can
notice that the case when the core elements are attacked, i.e.,
Case B is the most difficult to address as such failures can
lead to the partitioning of the overall network infrastructure.
In such cases, the gossip is not able to recover all the lost
messages, as a small portion of them remains undelivered
even with a high fanout (due to the high connectivity of the
faulty routers able to partially and temporarily partition the
overall infrastructure). Also, gossiping is made not possible
to overcome such fragmentation: if a loss occurs in a given
part of the infrastructure, the nodes in the other parts are not
always able to support the recovery from such losses. The
other two cases (i.e., A and C) are simpler to recover from
as the gossip can circumvent the failed routers and resend the
lost messages.
To study the impact of a disaster scale on the performance
of our gossiping scheme, we focused on Case A to show
the success rate values as a function of the percentage of
failed routers in the cluster. Results presented in Fig. 11
show the impact of the increasing scale of a disaster on
the increase of the latency due to the higher redundancy
degree applied to tolerate all the losses imposed by the
network.
FIGURE 12. Latency for Case A as a function of the percentage of faulty
routers, for success rate = 1.
FIGURE 13. Success rate difference as a function of the fanout over the
different cases A-C without and with DoS attack being applied, by having
3 colluded malicious nodes.
Fig. 12 shows the latency achievable for Case A when
increasing the number of faulty routers due to a disaster
at the success rate equal to 1 obtained with a fanout of 5,
7 and 12 respectively for 5%, 10%, and 20% of faulty nodes.
It is evident that the size of a disaster impacts gossiping by
increasing the mean latency due to the higher fanout needed
for full delivery of the messages.
C. DoS PROTECTION EVALUATION
Experiments described in this subsection were performed
assuming the occurrence of a DoS attack in the post-disaster
period. The executed gossiping protocol is augmented by
the solutions described in the previous Sec. III. As depicted
in Fig. 13, the difference in the success rate between the cases
with and without a DoS attack is visible. It is since under
a DoS attack, messages are used to compromise the avail-
ability of the target node rather than being useful in letting
nodes recover from their losses. Also, the congestion within
the network results in additional messages being lost. The
difference between the impacts of the three cases of disaster
scenarios A-C on the efficiency of gossiping is evident also
in the context of the effects introduced by the DoS attack in
the post-disaster period, with Case B being the one with the
highest difference.
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FIGURE 14. The gossip utility over an increasing number of nodes
involved in DoS attempts and related to Case C with fanout 3.
FIGURE 15. Analysis of the success rate over an increasing number of
nodes involved in a DoS attempt, related to Case C with fanout 3.
Fig. 14 presents results for the utility of the gossip mes-
sages without and with our extensions, referred to as ‘‘with-
out protection’’, and ‘‘with protection’’ cases, accordingly.
Results related to DoS attacks analyzed for different numbers
of colluded nodes sending fake messages (whose number
follows the fanout) are presented in Fig. 14 for the disaster
Case C.
Generally speaking, gossiping does not exhibit a utility
equal to 1, as reported in [44]. However, in the post-disaster
scenario, the appearance of a DoS attack can decrease the
utility even more. From Fig. 14, it is evident that the utility
is higher for our gossiping approach than in the case of no
protection. It proves that our approach helps in preventing
DoS attack attempts. Similar trends were noticed for the other
disaster cases A and B. However, we can notice that the utility
decreases slightly, as there are cases when fake feedback
messages are considered valid.
Fig. 15 presents the comparison of the success rate val-
ues for our gossiping scheme (‘‘with protection’’) with the
basic gossiping scheme (‘‘no protection’’) and the reference
success rate of 1.0 achievable under no attacks for Case C.
It shows that the reduction in the gossip utility due to DoS
attacks correlates with a decrease in the attainable success
rate, as already presented before. Our approach can obtain the
success rate closer to the one exhibited by the case without
FIGURE 16. Analysis of the overhead over an increasing number of nodes
involved in a DoS attempt, related to Case C with fanout 3.
FIGURE 17. Analysis of the power consumption with TLS and our
approach being applied with and without DoS attacks, related to Case C
with fanout 3.
any attacks. The two trends (i.e., orange and grey curves) do
not follow the same pattern due to the message suppression
mechanism of our approach. It, in turn, shows the successful
feedback deception.
Last, Fig. 16 presents the measured overhead in terms of
additional messages exchanged over the network for Case C.
From Fig. 16, it is clear that in the case of our approach,
the overhead is considerably reduced, which proves a protec-
tion degree against the adverse effects of such attacks.
To show the power efficiency of our approach, we analyzed
the power consumption by considering the cost of receiv-
ing a gossip message of about 1 kB taken from [74] for
a representative resource-constrained device. We compared
it with the power consumption of the handshake scheme of
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [75] – a standard protection
strategy against DoS attacks to protect communications and
authenticate the message sender and cryptographic primi-
tives to guarantee message authentication and integrity. The
port randomization does not imply any worsening in energy
consumption. The solution based on identity management
and removing those nodes detected as malicious does not
have a direct worsening of energy consumption when sending
messages, but when maintaining the correct view of iden-
tities within the system. We are aware that TLS has more
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features than our solution, so that the comparison may look
unfair. However, as protection against DoS attacks requires to
prevent eavesdropping, tampering and message forgery, TLS
is a perfect candidate to protect gossip against DoS attacks.
Concerning this issue, we are interested in their comparison
and it will be the base of our future work for the protection
against message forgery by optimizing the use of TLS and
similar cryptographic primitives.
Five protocols, shown in Fig. 17, were analyzed related
to Case C, representing technology-related disasters: con-
ventional gossiping (‘‘no protection’’), classic gossiping with
TLS, and our gossiping scheme – both analyzed for two
scenarios of DoS attacks and no attacks being applied. From
Fig. 17, we can notice that TLS introduces a fixed over-
head due to the handshake performed between the sender
and receiver of the gossip message, even if there are no
attacks. It is worth noting that this is not the case for our
approach. When a DoS attack is introduced, the overhead of
TLS grows and is visibly higher than the one obtained for our
message suppression scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
This article addressed the problem of the resilience of
a retransmission-based recovery scheme called gossip, in par-
ticular in the case when challenged by DoS attacks in the
post-disaster scenario. The attack model for this distributed
algorithm was presented, and the related literature on the
available protection means was discussed. We noticed that
countermeasures for DoS attacks rely mainly on crypto-
graphic primitives or trust management, which do not scale
well and are inefficient in post-disaster scenarios. We pro-
posed a solution based on game theory and showed that it has
the merit to reduce the occurrence of overloading due to such
attacks. It is clear that there is room for improvement, and
further work is needed to have a fully secure approach against
DoS attacks, such as adequately integrating cryptographic
primitives to support the secure gossiping. As mentioned
above in the paper, a possible future direction of our work
consists in properly integrating our approach with crypto-
graphic primitives and to trigger opportunistically the use of
TLS or similar cryptographic primitives when our approach
is starting to become compromised. We will investigate the
use of signaling games [76] for this aim.
The open problem for our approach is that the adversary
may issue not only fake requests for retransmissions but also
the feedback, which may compromise the decision making.
Moreover, the attacker may be able to alter the content of the
exchanged messages using cooperative transmission proto-
cols, making our approach compromised. As in this article,
we did not rely on cryptographic primitives, to avoid forg-
ing the fake feedback and malicious modification of valid
messages, we can further introduce heuristics to assure the
received response are valid. One possible solution that we
consider is based on the reception time: a node monitors
the latency needed by another node to send feedback and
assumes the received feedback messages to be valid only if
received within the estimated latency. It is thus possible to
have a more sophisticated approach by modelling the inter-
action among the nodes as a dynamic Bayesian signalling
game [76] and accepting/refusing incoming messages based
on the node assumptions of the sender being honest or mali-
cious, similarly as applied in [77] or [78] in the context of
the positioning systems and trust management. We leave this
more sophisticated approach for future work.
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